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George H. Taylort
In recent years progressive critique of the legal enterprise has derived
from two principle sources: the legal realist and Marxian traditions.'
Succinctly expressed, these traditions have rejected the law's claim to
objectivity. The legal realists have argued that legal decision-making
involves not formal, deductive logic but subjective choice; any legal
choice made is never logically compelled.2 In the Marxian tradition the
objection has been not so much that the law is imbued with values, but
that the distribution of legal outcomes is skewed to particular values,
particular interests; the law reflects dominant economic interests.3
Stated this simply, the views of the two critical legal traditions may be
subject to as much rhetorical denunciation as affirmation. In contrast,
one of the key merits of the articles collected in The Politics of Law4 is
that discussion is moved to a fundamentally different plane. In conso-
nance with a growing movement in the social sciences, these essays mark
a greater refinement of critical reflection. Arguments are becoming in-
creasingly concrete and analytically precise. Most significantly, this de-
velopment indicates not merely that critical legal positions have
attained greater clarity but that their nature has changed. While still
• THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE. Edited by David Kairys, New
York: Pantheon Books, 1982, Pp. 321, $22.50 (paper, $9.95).
t Ph.D. candidate, University of Chicago. I wish to extend my greatest thanks to
Candice Hoke for her critical commentary on this review; her insights have informed every
section.
1. A third major progressive tradition, legal critique based on feminist interpretation, is in
a period of striking new growth; its impact is still largely to be felt. I shall argue later that
although the feminist legal critique is still new and largely underrepresented in the legal
literature, the insights it introduces are distinctive and decisive contributions to the progres-
sive critique offered by the heirs of the legal realist and Marxian traditions. See injfa text
accompanying notes 36, 37, 39-44, 74, & 75, and notes 39, 76, 91, 102, & 103.
2. See Mensch, The Histoty ofMainstream Legal Thought, infta note 4, 18, 26-29 (brief discus-
sion of the claims of legal realism).
3. See, e.g., Kairys, Introduction, infra note 4, 1, 5 (criticizing this Marxist model).
4. THE POLITICS OF LAw (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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affirming that legal decision-making does involve subjective choice and
does reflect dominant economic interests, the new positions cannot be
typified this transparently. These essays attest that the days of the mon-
olithic characterization-the law as nothing but subjective choice, the
law as nothing but a reflection of an underlying economic base-may
swiftly be passing. The concreteness and precision of these essays aid
not simply the demystification of law but the demystification of the crit-
ical stance taken toward law. This is a major advance, and it makes a
critical legal position much more compelling.
In demonstrating how far critical legal analysis has progressed, the
essays under review also indicate the current limits of this advance. If
these essays strongly argue the invalidity of the reigning legal para-
digm-the law as objective and impartial-they also suggest that a re-
placement paradigm is not so easily achieved. Reconstruction of a legal
paradigm remains a complex and arduous task. As later sections of this
review will delineate, however, reconstructive efforts may be greatly as-
sisted by current work in philosophy and social theory. To agree with
the essays under review that legal decision-making does not follow a de-
ductive, value-neutral logic does not entail that the law allows no model
of rationality whatsoever. If the correct model for legal reason is not
"pure reason," it may instead be "practical reason." Legal positions are
not arbitrary because value-laden; as the model of "practical reason"--
and these essays themselves-amply demonstrate, legal positions can be
and precisely must be rigorously argued. To admit the disproportionate
influence powerful economic and political interests have over the law
may imply not that the model of practical reason is denied but rather
that it has been perverted. In reflecting on the value of these essays, the
aim here will be not only to build on but also to push further the impor-
tant work they have accomplished. 5
I. The Model Challenged
Discrediting the law's claim to objectivity is the fundamental task of
these essays. The model criticized has two basic aspects. Its first conten-
tion is that legal reasoning has a formal purity that leaves it uncontami-
nated by questions of substance. The model acknowledges that
questions of substance enter legal considerations, but they are resolved
by recourse to autonomous rational criteria alone.6 According to this
5. The analytic framework presented in this review is not articulated directly in THE
PoLIrics OF LAw. My hope is that this framework may situate better both the arguments of
this volume and the import here claimed for them.
6. See, e.g., Kairys, supra note 3, at 1 (criticizing the pure rationality model of law).
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view, rules or results are legally required; they are deductions from tran-
scendent legal principles. 7 Legal reasoning is said to be "distinct, as a
method for reaching correct results, from ethical and political discourse
in general. . . ."I The law is an autonomous system of rules and con-
cepts.9 Substantive questions are decided, but decision proceeds accord-
ing to a formal, "objective" modality.
The second aspect of the model of legal objectivity is that the objec-
tivity claimed is not simply formal but is also value-neutral. While it
might be possible for some formal legal system to rule systematically-
that is, in a formally rigorous way--either for or against the interests of
a certain group,10 the contention here is that the objectivity of the law
entails formally equal treatment for all. This is "the common character-
ization of the law and the state as neutral, value-free arbiters, independ-
ent of and unaffected by social and economic relations, political forces,
and cultural phenomena."'I An implication is that all persons subject to
the law have an equal opportunity to participate under-and be judged
by-the law. As impartial objectivity, the law engenders formal
equality. 12
II. Early Critiques
In criticizing both the supposed formality of legal logic and the sup-
posed value-neutrality of its decisions, the articles under review expand
7. See, e.g., Kairys, Freedom of Speech, supra note 4, 140, 161 (criticizing the stated model).
8. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Herarchy, supra note 4, 40, 47 (criticizing the
stated model).
9. See Greer, Antonio Gramsci and "Legal Hegemony," supra note 4, 301, 308 (criticizing the
stated model). Greer remarks that this position is typified by H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAw (1961). Greer, supra note 4, at 309 n.13.
10. Rand Rosenblatt suggests that this is a stance advocating formal inequality. See Ro-
senblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, supra note 4, 262, 271.
11. Kairys, supra note 3, at 4 (criticizing the value-neutrality theory).
12. For the authors in THE POLMCS OF LAw, the implications of this view are several.
Alan Freeman indicates the consequences for antidiscrimination law:
[M]odern American law has adopted what I have called the perpetrator perspective. It
purports to be a stance of society as a whole, or of a disinterested third-party gaze looking
down on the problem of discrimination, and it simply does not care about results. Dis-
crimination becomes the action of individuals, the atomistic behavior of persons and
institutions who have been abstracted out of actual society as part of a quest for villains.
It is a notion of racial discrimination as something that is caused by individuals, or indi-
vidual institutions, producing discrete results that can be identified as discrimination and
thereafter neutralized.
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law.. A Critical View, supra note 4, 96, 98-99. Peter Gabel and Jay
Feinman argue that maintenance of this model of objectivity leads to "the utopian imagery of
freedom of contract." Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideologp, supra note 4, 172. See also
Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511 (1981) ("[The
industrial pluralist view of labor relations is based upon a false assumption: the assumption
that management and labor have equal power in the workplace.").
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earlier, similar critiques. Brief, more analytic excursion into the sub-
stance of these earlier critiques may better situate the new contributions.
Objection to the model of an autonomous legal rationality derives prin-
cipally from the legal realists of the early twentieth century. These real-
ists argued the absence of an objective legal methodology behind which
judges could hide.'3 No pre-existing right determines a particular result,
they claimed, because there are "conflicting (and contradictory) rights
between which the court must always choose."1' 4 Early legal realism "ef-
fectively undermined the fundamental premises of liberal legalism, par-
ticularly the crucial distinction between legislation (subjective exercise
of will) and adjudication (objective exercise of reason). '15
Criticism of the value-neutrality of the law springs in large part from
Marxian sources. Here the argument was that the law is not at all sub-
jectively capricious, a matter of individual judicial choice. Rather, the
view was that the interests of capital determine the logic-and results-
of legal decision-making. 16 "[W]hether employees had won or lost a
case [in labor law], doctrinal developments were viewed as 'expressions'
or 'emanations' of a unified, pre-given historical subject (e.g., 'monopoly
capitalism')."' 7 The law was said to be merely reflective of the power of
the ruling class in the state or of the inevitable logic of capitalism.18
An abstraction called The Law is seen as an instrument through which
another abstraction called The State exercises power on behalf of the bour-
geoisie. The Law, while pretending to be a benign, neutral force dispens-
ing justice, equality, and due process, actually is but a fraudulent cover-up
for the force through which The State rules.19
13. Set Mensch, supra note 2, at 28.
14. Id at 27.
15. Id at 28-29.
16. No necessary contradiction exists between the realist position that the law has no
autonomous, formal logic and the Marxian position that the law serves the needs of capital in
a highly logical manner. The realists argue there is no abstract logic inherent in the law; legal
reasoning is instead a matter of judicial choice. They also recognize, however, that judicial
choice may well follow the exigencies of social policy. Se id at 26. The Marxians would
agree that the logic maintained by the law is not autonomous, but they also would argue that
the law follows a certain logic that consistently reflects certain social interests. While the legal
realist and Marxian orientations do not contradict one another, it still might be of signifi-
cance to pursue not only the nature of their differences but how these differences inform the
views of the contemporary critical stances that the essays under review reflect.
17. Klare, Cn'tical Theoy and Labor Relations Law, supra note 4, 65, 66.
18. Greer, supra note 9, at 308.
19. Rabinowitz, The Radical Tradition in the Law, supra note 4, 310, 312. Rabinowitz typi-
fies the early radical view in quoting the American socialist leader, Daniel DeLeon: "'What
does the class struggle mean but that the material necessities of the lawyer will compel him to
commit the crimes against the working class that every lawyer in the country commits to-
day?'" Id at 311.
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III. Contemporary Critiques
In their argumentation against the supposed objectivity of the law,
contemporary responses both advance and reformulate the earlier criti-
cisms. Unlike earlier critiques, however, they do not fall so easily into
distinctly Marxian or legal realist formulations. Comparison with the
earlier critical stances may therefore be more profitable by reference to
analytic rather than historical lineage.
A. The Critique of Law as Formal Rationality
Current discussion of the claimed formal rationality of the law does
not so much modify as extend and amplify earlier criticisms. In The
Politics of Law, this effort is exemplified by an essay on legal precedents.
If legal reasoning has the autonomy it asserts, then where questions of
law are presented, judges should be bound by and defer to precedents.
Political judgments should have no role.20 Examination of cases, how-
ever, reveals that judicial subservience to legal precedents
neither leads to nor requires any particular results or rationales in specific
cases. A wide variety of precedents and a still wider variety of interpreta-
tions and distinctions are available from which to pick and choose. Social
and political judgments about the substance, parties, and context of the
case guide such choices, even when they are not the explicit or conscious
basis of decision.2 '
The early legal realists are thus affirmed in their contention that legal
reasoning is more a matter of choice than of some abstract, objective
rationality.
The objective necessity of legal rationality is undermined further by
historical and comparative analysis. The inviolability of legal categories
is contested when definitions of criminality, for example, are seen to be
"neither cross-culturally universal nor intraculturally uncontrover-
sial. '" 2 2 From a historical perspective, the independence of legal reason-
ing from social and political contexts--the viability of strict, predictable
rules-must be questioned when it is established that "the belief-struc-
tures that rule our lives are not found in nature but are historically con-
tingent; they have not always existed in their present form."12 3
Critical commentary also demonstrates that the variability of legal
judgment influences not simply the judicial decision but in fact affects
every step of the legal process. Wherever there is latitude, there too is
20. See, e.g., Kairys, Legal Reasoning, supra note 4, 11.
21. Id at 14.
22. Kelman, The O'igins of Cn'me and Cnminal Violence, supra note 4, 214, 221.
23. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, supra note 4, 281, 289.
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the opportunity for bias, for deviation from the supposed objective
norm. "The modern legal system is full of points of discretion-from
the arresting officer on the beat through the prosecutor to the trial
judge. The points of discretion are the portals through which much of
the racism in the system enters."' 24 Regulatory agencies are another ex-
ample of areas where the claimed formal rationality of the legal system
is contravened. These agencies may fail to reach their regulatory goals
because of procedural problems ranging from inadequate funding to
constraints caused by excessive legal and bureaucratic formalism. 25
Even where procedural and substantive rights are affirmed, the law may
still fail to maintain this aura of rationality. The dilemma of welfare-
rights legislation is a good illustration. Even in situations where welfare
rights are legally recognized, the very assertion of these rights may tend
to undermine or work against recipients' interests. A legal victory ex-
panding welfare eligibility may well generate a political backlash, such
as a state reduction in the amount of the grant.2 6 Criticism that the law
does not embody some objective, disinterested logic is confirmed not
simply at the point of judicial decision-making but at each step through-
out the legal process. The amount of discretion available, at a multiplic-
ity of points in the legal system, fundamentally belies the notion that
some autonomous, purely rational structure is at work.
B. The Critique of Law as Value-Neutral
If contemporary criticism of the law's claim to autonomous, objective
rationality basically amplifies the earlier legal realist critique, contem-
porary reaction to the earlier Marxian stance follows a somewhat differ-
ent course. Criticism of the law's claim to value-neutrality is
perpetuated-and in some distinctively new ways-but criticism is also
levied against the traditional Marxian model itself. The contention is
not that the old Marxian orientation must be overthrown but that it
must be transformed.
The most prominent criticism is that the depiction of the law as sim-
ply superstructural, as simply a reflection of the power of the ruling class
or of the logic of capitalism, must be discarded. Significantly, this argu-
ment does not deny that economic forces have great power over the
character of society; it rather rejects that law is simply a product of these
economic forces. "Legal rules the state enforces and legal concepts that
24. Burns, Race Discn'mtnation Law and Race hn America, supra note 4, 89, 94. See also Rudov-
sky, The CrimnalJustice System and the Rol of the Police, supra note 4, 242, 243-44.
25. See Abel, Torts, sutra note 4, 185, 192.
26. See Rosenblatt, supra note 10, at 272-73.
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permeate all aspects of social thought constitute capitalism as well as
responding to the interests that operate within it. Law is an aspect of
the social totality, not just the tail of the dog."' 27 Various areas of the
law-tort law, for example-may be intimately related to capitalism as
both cause and effect. 28 The development and elaboration of collective
bargaining law, another example, may be said precisely to contribute to
the character of American capitalism. 29
Rejection of the view that law is simply superstructural encourages
the emergence of new critical theories focusing specifically on the consti-
tutive role of law. For the traditional Marxian perspective, analysis of
law was only a subcategory of economic critique; the legal structure only
exemplified its economic foundation. As the essays in The Politics of Law
document, however, evidence that law constitutes as well as responds to
economic and social structures helps independent analysis of law to
regain its importance.
Characterization of law as superstructural is, therefore, fundamen-
tally transformed. Nonetheless, much of the critique deriving from
Marxian sources is preserved. The contention that law is not value-neu-
tral is both maintained and augmented. Greater analytic precision and
increased empirical evidence are utilized within these essays to substan-
tiate this claim, and the active role of law in perpetuating differential
impact is reaffirmed.
The enhanced understanding of the interest-laden nature of law is in
part a result of more detailed historical investigation. The neutrality of
law must be challenged when the law is discerned to change in response
to the values of the socioeconomic system. 30 In contrast to the critique
focusing on the law's supposed objective rationality, where analysis
reveals that underlying rules and concepts in fact change over time, the
contention here is that the change correlates with specific interests.
That law is not only value-laden, but discriminatorily so, is reaffirmed
by analyses of specific legal domains. "Criminal proscriptions are not
class-neutral. Some crimes, such as vagrancy, disorderly conduct, public
drunkenness, and certain drug offenses, are primarily aimed at the lower
economic classes. ' '3 t The availability and generosity of legal remedies
also differ by class. Employment-related injuries are far more likely to
be sustained by blue-collar workers than by others. Relegation of such
27. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 49. See also Kairys, supra note 3, at 5 and Greer, supra note
9, at 308.
28. See Abel, supra note 25, at 186.
29. See Klare, supra note 17, at 66.
30. See Gabel & Feinman, supra note 12, passin. Their example is contract law.
31. Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 243.
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injuries to workers' compensation, which pays only a fraction of tort
damages and rejects completely some claims otherwise valid in tort, dif-
ferentially impacts on this class.3 2 The money bail system, another ex-
ample, is responsible for the incarceration of many alleged offenders
simply because of their poverty.33 Further, even seemingly fair proscrip-
tions and procedures may function inequitably. In criminal trials "[t]he
quality of counsel, investigative efforts, and other critical aspects of the
defense are greatly dependent on the wealth of the defendant. ' 34
Aside from adding greater specificity to and greater evidence for the
claim that the law is discriminatorily value-laden, contemporary cri-
tique also establishes that the impact is differential along more than just
economic lines. Most notably, the law discriminates according to race
and sex as well. The poor discriminated against by the money bail sys-
tem are disproportionately people of color.35 As for discrimination ac-
cording to sex, "[m]ale control in the public sphere has often been
consolidated explicitly by legal means. The law, however, is in large
part absent from the private sphere, and that absence itself has contrib-
uted to male dominance and female subservience." '36 One practical re-
sult of the law's absence from the "private" realm is the licensing of
men's exploitation of women within the family unit. 37
The significance of these charges must not be mistaken. Evidence of
the law's discriminatory impact according to sex and race does not sim-
ply render discrimination within the law more acutely visible. Instead,
it moves critical discussion to a new analytic level. Thus far this review
has established that the contemporary critique advances greatly over its
predecessors. Analysis has demonstrated that one of the signal contribu-
tions of this criticism is the elimination of the old view, stemming from
traditional Marxian sources, that law is simply a representation, a reflec-
tion, of economic interests. Contemporary criticism reaffirms that law is
value-laden and that it endorses, in discriminatory fashion, particular
32. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 25, at 189.
33. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 24, at 94.
34. Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 243. In virtually all noncriminal cases, of course, the poor
are entitled to no assistance of counsel.
35. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 24, at 94. If in discriminating against the poor the law
discriminates against people of color, it should not be forgotten that it also discriminates
against women, who account for a disproportionate number of the poor.
Recall that the point here is not that the discretionary moments of the law may--and do-
allow discrimination to flourish; this is an argument that the law is not formally rational but
affords many occasions for choice. Instead, here the objection is that the law is value-laden,
and in a discriminatory fashion.
36. Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, supra note 4,
117, 118, 121-24.
37. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, supra note 4, 294, 298.
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interests, but it goes beyond these claims in insisting that law is not sim-
ply responsive to these interests, it in fact helps to constitute them. Con-
sequently, independent assessment of the role of law is made not only
relevant but highly significant. This is a most important advance. With
the analysis of sex and race discrimination, however, no longer can the
law be said solely to reflect or constitute what are at bottom economic
interests, interests that previously were thought to control and subsume
all others. The monolithic view of the law, under criticism since the
superstructural characterization of the law was rejected, is finally
surmounted.
The argument that economic and racial discrimination are separable,
if often overlapping, seems recently to have won acceptance in the camp
of progressive critique.38 The distinctiveness-and critical signifi-
cance-of discrimination based on sex is still much less appreciated,
however.39 Brief recourse to-and greater substantiation of-the exam-
ple of sex discrimination may elucidate how fully the old monolithic
view of the law is overcome and how striking are the implications of this
transformation for the progressive legal critique. If a distinction be-
tween the interests of racism and those of the dominant economic forces
is legitimate, a distinction should also be made between sexist and eco-
nomic interests. "[C]apitalism and patriarchy do not always operate in
analogous ways, [and this] has implications for an understanding of the
role of law in relationship to each of these systems." 4 Women have
been denied equal benefits under law-ranging from education to em-
ployment to the vote-that express much more distinctly patriarchal
rather than purely economic interests.41 An argument might be ad-
vanced, for instance, that certain patriarchal interests--such as the de-
nial of equal employment opportunities for women-may work in fact
to the detriment of economic interests-the loss of women's talents in
38. See Freeman, supra note 12, at 107-10 (agreement that economic and racial discrimi-
nation are separable does not resolve exactly how they are distinct, a query still very much in
debate).
39. Polan states explicitly that integration of feminist and Marxist theoretical perspec-
tives is still very much in process; as her discussion makes clear, part of the problem is estab-
lishing how distinct the two approaches are. See Polan, supra note 37, at 294-96. See also
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxim, Method, and the State.- An Agenda for Theoty, 7 SIGNS: J. OF
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOCIETY 515, 515-27 (1982).
40. Polan, supra note 37, at 296.
41. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 36, at 118-20. The argument is not that women
have avoided economic discrimination written into law and particular to their sex. As Taub
and Schneider note, "Under English common law, not only were [women] barred from cer-
tain professions (such as law), but, once married, they were reduced to legal nonentities un-
able to sell, sue, or contract without the approval of their husbands or other male relatives."
Id at 119. More central to the argument here, though, is that economic and sex discrimina-
tion do not proceed as one; the discriminatory interests involved are separable.
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the economy. 4 2 The failure of the law to perpetuate economic interests
alone again wreaks havoc with any undifferentiated characterization.
Because the law incorporates several diverse and sometimes compet-
ing interests, suspicion must also be raised about any claim that the law
represents any one interest unambiguously. A return to the relation be-
tween patriarchal interests and the role of law in preserving the pub-
lic/private dichotomy is illustrative. By maintaining that the law
should operate only in the public realm, the courts have decided that
questions of "private" rights should generally be determined without re-
course to the courts or to state regulation. Often this position continues
male dominance. Marital rape is still not recognized in many states.
Under doctrines of interspousal and parent-child immunity, courts have
refused recovery for injuries such as those resulting from domestic vio-
lence that would have otherwise been compensable but for their occur-
rence in the "private" realm. Contract law is unavailable during a
marriage to enforce support obligations.43 Yet legal decisions based on
the public/private dichotomy do not always work to the detriment of
women's rights. Supreme Court cases striking down restrictions on the
use of contraceptives and abortion ruled precisely on the basis that the
restrictions constituted unconstitutional state interference into the "pri-
vate" sphere of life. 44
These essays, in sum, argue a strong case against any monolithic view
of law.45 In this they move substantially beyond their predecessors, and
they do so on the basis of broadly informed critical examination. In
spite of these strengths, however, it is less clear what orientation to law
results from these analyses. As the editor of The Politics of Law notes,
"[A]t this early stage, our critiques of the law and traditional legal the-
ory are more fully developed than our formulations of a coherent alter-
native theory." Some conclusions are drawn by various authors in the
book, and these points warrant mention. Additionally, by utilizing in-
sights drawn from contemporary work in philosophy and social theory,
critical legal theory may be advanced further than the essays explicitly
acknowledge.
42. But see, e.g., Eisenstein, Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism,
in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 5 (Z. Eisenstein ed.
1979) (arguing the mutual dependence of capitalism and patriarchy as presently practiced).
43. See Taub & Schneider, supra note 36, at 121.
44. See Polan, supra note 37, at 299.
45. The claim is not that all or even any of the authors represented in THE PoLrrIcs OF
LAw makes this argument or would agree with each of its parts. A claim is made, though,
that the argument is a fair representation of some commonly persisting themes.
46. Kairys, supra note 4, at 280 (introductory remarks to Part III).
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IV. Critical Reconstruction
If these critical essays ably substantiate that the law is not objective
but value-laden, they also demonstrate that the law does not represent
only one interest exclusively nor represent any one interest unambigu-
ously. The implications of these results for characterization of legal rea-
soning and the legal process in general suggest:
There is no legally required rule or result, and despite endless attempts by
judges and legal scholars to find transcendent legal principles, there simply
are none. But one can make sense of these decisions by examining the
social and political contexts in which they were made, and by viewing
legal decision making and law as political processes.47
To maintain that law has a political character is at least in part to reiter-
ate that law embodies certain interests.48 The manifestation of these
interests counters the law's claim to an autonomous, objective rational-
ity, and the perpetuation of these diverse interests counters the law's
claim to value-neutrality. Demonstration that law is not impartially
objective but political in character is the major deconstructive insight of
the essays under review.
What these essays do not generally pursue, however, are the recon-
structive possibilities available from this deconstructive result. 49 Docu-
mentation that law is not impartially objective or value-neutral but
instead interest-laden does not ineluctably imply that law is simply a
battleground between competing interests. The model of law the essays
criticize is rightly discredited, but others may be available. The model
47. Kairys, supra note 7, at 161.
48. Note that there is a distinction between affirming that the law has a political charac-
ter and what seems Karys' point, that the law is only a political process. See id See also
Kairys, supra note 20, at 17 ("Law is simply politics by other means.").
Kairys seems to reduce the law to manifestations of power; by this move, however, he also
reduces the nature of politics. This reduction must be contested. In arguing later that the
model for legal reasoning should best be described as "practical reason," the element of power
is not dismissed but placed in coordination with efforts at practical--that is, interest-laden-
argumentation. This agrees with the classical, Aristotelian affinity between practical reason
and politics. See infa text accompanying notes 96-99.
49. The contention that reconstruction must go forward and that it must do so and can
do so by following deconstructive efforts to their limits is one of the major contributions of the
work of Paul Ricoeur. On the nature of deconstruction refer to the work of Jacques Derrida.
See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976); WRrrING AND DIFFERENCE (1978); Posi-
TIONS (1981). Ricoeur's most direct criticism of Derrida is available in P. RICOEUR, THE
RULE OF METAPHOR 280-95 (1977). The struggle between what are here termed deconstruc-
tion and reconstruction is a persistent theme throughout Ricoeur's corpus. See, e.g., P.
RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY (1970) at 32-35 (differentiation between a hermeneutics
of suspicion and a hermeneutics of reappropriation) and 419-94 (the tension between archeol-
ogy-from Freud, not Foucault---and teleology).
A final comment on reconstruction: it should not be viewed as necessarily conservative
because re-constructive. A reconstruction is not equivalent to a recreation; the latter is pas-
sively imitative, the former may be transformative.
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this review proposes is that law be seen as a "constructed totality." Karl
Klare typifies the concerns of this paradigm as applied to an analysis of
society as a whole.
[W]e have. . . lacked an explanatory model that goes significantly beyond
referring the results in all instances to the omnipresent "needs of capital";
that is, we have been slow to develop a theory of capitalist society as a
"constructed totality" of the diverse dimensions of social and political life,
of the multifarious relations of power, forms of organization, and institu-
tional and communication patterns that together constitute our social
world. 50
The reconstructive effort undertaken in the remainder of this review will
explore the applicability of the alternative paradigm in two different
ways. Each of these approaches will respond to the law's incorporation
of various interests, the first by attempting to reconstruct the character
of law in general, the second by attempting to reconstruct the nature of
legal reasoning. This division corresponds to the two forms of progres-
sive legal critique articulated earlier, criticism of the law's claim both to
value-neutrality and to a formal, autonomous rationality.
A. Reconstruction of the Character of Law
In attempting to utilize the paradigm of a constructed totality to re-
construct the character of law, the first requirement is clarification of
the proposed model itself. Most helpful here is the analysis of the con-
cept of hegemony elaborated by the early twentieth century Italian
Marxist, Antonio Gramsci. 51 Gramsci developed the concept of hegem-
ony to explain the pervasive power of the dominant forces in society.
Economic and class interests do not rule society, says Gramsci, simply
through the coercive apparatus of the state. Rather, the power of these
dominant forces is also exercised through the permeation of its values
and interests in the private organizations-churches, trade unions,
schools-that compose and define civil society. This permeation of the
dominant forces' interests throughout civil society defines their hegem-
ony.52 The dominant forces do not control civil society merely exter-
nally, then, but exercise subtle internal control as well.
The pervasiveness of the dominant interests' influence might at first
50. Klare, supra note 17, at 66.
51. For references to Gramsci in THE PoLrncs OF LAw, see Greer, supra note 9, passim,
and Gordon, supra note 23, at 286-87.
52. See A. GRAMscI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI
56 n.5 (Q. Hoare & G. Smith eds. & trans. 1971). See also Greer, supra note 9, at 305 (quoting
C. BocGs, GRAMSCI's MARXisM 39-40 (1976)).
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glance seem a prescription for political resignation, 53 but this is too lim-
ited a reading of Gramsci's insights. The interrelation between the
dominant forces and the forces composing civil society is complex.
While the interests of the dominant forces do pervade civil society, the
perpetuation of these interests depends on a measure of active and in-
dependent support by the institutions that compose civil society. The
dominant forces do not unilaterally influence or determine the forces of
civil society; the relationship is much more one of interdependence. 54
Further, the interests of the forces that form civil society are to a degree
separable from those of the dominant forces, and the dominant forces
must be at least partly responsive to these interests.
[Tihe dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests
of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a
continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on
the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and
those of the subordinate groups-equilibria in which the interests of the
dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short
53. In fact Gramsci did develop the concept of hegemony in response to the Bolshevik
Revolution's failure to be replicated in the West. Gramsci concluded that because civil soci-
ety was much more elaborated in the West than in the Soviet Union, the hegemonic forces
were that much more difficult to defeat. See Greer, supra note 9, at 304.
54. To indicate the complexity of the structure of society Gramsci frequently uses the
imagery of trench warfare. The social structure is so complex that it is
resistant to the catastrophic 'incursions' of the immediate economic element (crises, de-
pressions, etc.) .... In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack
seemed to have destroyed the enemy's entire defensive system, whereas in fact it had only
destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance and attack the assail-
ants would find themselves confronted by a line of defence which was still effective. The
same thing happens in politics, during the great economic crises.
A. GRAMScI, supra note 52, at 235. Gramsci returns to the same theme a few pages later:
"The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as com-
plexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the 'trenches'
of the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position. . . " Id at 243.
Despite such continuing evidence of the role played by those forces in the "trenches" of
society, critics may rightly question whether I am true to Gramsci in my interpretation that
these forces play an active, and not merely responsive, role in the perpetuation of the society's
dominant forces. Indeed, Gramsci does seem to maintain at points the traditional Marxist
model that the forces of civil society are merely superstructural. (For example, see the sen-
tence deleted in the extended quotation cited above, where Gramsci says: "The superstruc-
tures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare." Id at 235.) As Gramsci's
editors point out, however, Gramsci himself is not consistent on this matter. The relation-
ships between the state, civil society, and economic activity remain ambiguous. Sometimes,
for example, as in the citation just mentioned, civil society composes the outer trenches; at
other times the outer trench is the state. See Hoare & Smith, Introduction to Notes on State and
Civil Society, supra note 52, at 207-09. Whatever the interpretive difficulties, however, Gram-
sci's basic conception of hegemony makes no sense if the forces of civil society do not have at
least some independent powers. Otherwise, the dominant forces would not need to be respon-
sive to the forces of civil society, no possibility of the development of counter-hegemonic
forces would exist, and the possibility of radical social transformation, the most basic of
Gramsci's aims, would be rendered completely void.
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of narrowly corporate economic interest.5 5
Based on this complex characterization, it becomes more apparent
how counter-hegemonic forces can arise and thrive. To the extent indi-
vidual forces in civil society are able to maintain their independence,
they are also able to establish their own identity. This may require
great discipline, patience, and self-awareness. Development of counter-
hegemonic forces also depends on creation of alternative cultures and
alternative bases of power. A radical strike at the dominant forces will
not counter-balance the persisting hegemonic influences in civil society.
Battle must first be waged-and won-in the trenches of civil society
before any direct attack on the dominant forces themselves will be
effective. 56
The great contribution of Gramsci's analysis of hegemony is that it
provides a framework for understanding how society-and, further,
law-can be a whole, a constructed totality, without being monolithic.
The deconstruction of any undifferentiated interpretation must be
maintained, but a view of the totality may nevertheless be resurrected.
To elucidate better what this transformation in perspective might entail
for characterization of law, the implications of this model should be con-
sidered at three different levels. Recourse to the constructed totality
model will affect, first, the depiction of society as a whole, second,
description of the role of law within society, and third, representation of
the possibilities for change and action in relation to law.
1. The Transformed Depiction of Society
To contend that society may be a totality without being ruled by one
interest exclusively is to retrieve some of Gramsci's most basic insights.
No one force dominates society to the exclusion of all others. Dominant
forces may permeate civil society, but they do not permeate it exhaus-
tively. The diverse interests that civil society encompasses-labor un-
ions, schools, churches, families-can act on their own behalf and in
partial independence from not only the dominant forces but the inter-
ests of each other. Further, no organizational group within civil society
maintains its interests in isolation; the influences of these interests extend
out into and, to greater or lesser degrees, permeate society themselves.
The character of society is formed by the contribution of its parts.
"[T]he internal relations of any nation," notes Gramsci, "are the result
of a combination which is 'original' and (in a certain sense)
55. A. GRAMSCI, supra note 52, at 182.
56. Seeid at 185.
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unique. . . -57 While the line of global development is toward interna-
tionalism, Gramsci continues, nevertheless "the point of departure is
'national'-and it is from this point of departure that one must begin."58
The internal relations of a nation or a society, then, must be understood
and conceived in their originality and uniqueness. The diverse interests
that compose society must not be collapsed into the interests of class or
of anything else; there will be regional, racial, ethnic, sexual, and class
variations, and no uniform cultural assimilation should be expected. It
is from these "trenches" that the existence of society as a whole must be
viewed.
The significance of this interpretation of society may be clarified by
comparison to a rigorous structuralist perspective.59 While the struc-
turalist orientation avows that society is governed by impersonal forces,
the model argued here maintains that these forces are not all-encom-
passing. The existence of different interests indicates that the structure
of society is not unambiguous; the interests of capital are not exactly
those of patriarchy. Further, the existence of these different interests
creates the structural indeterminancy and tension that allows opportu-
nities for action to occur. The results of these actions are not certain;
there is no suggestion that progressive change is inevitable. But most
critical is the persistence of the opportunity for change. The claim that
there is some underlying logic of historical necessity is fundamentally
undermined.W The transformed depiction of society entails that neither
the nature of society nor the path of history is assured.
Analysis therefore underscores the hegemonic control exerted by the
dominant forces in a society, but it establishes at the same time that this
influence depends on the support given to the dominant forces by the
organizations composing civil society. These organizations are thus
partly the cause for the perpetuation of the hegemonic influences; to the
extent they are able to assert their own independent or counter-hege-
monic interests, they may also assist in the hegemonic forces' downfall.
The concept of hegemony elucidates how a society assumes a certain
character as a whole; it also demonstrates that the whole is defined by
and depends on the confluence of its parts. The interests at work in a
society are neither singular and uniform nor insular and atomistic.
2. The Transformed Description of the Nature of Law within Society
This picture of intertwining interests at work in society reorients char-
57. Id at 240.
58. Id
59. The most germane example of a structuralist position for purposes here might be L.
ALTHUSSER, FOR MARX (1970).
60. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 291.
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acterization of the nature of law within society. Comparison with views
maintained in The Politics of Law illuminates this perspective. As deline-
ated earlier, a number of articles in the book continue the important
legal realist argument that political and economic factors situate and
influence legal reasoning.6' In so doing, however, they perpetuate a
view that whatever legal reasoning or law is, it exists within and is legiti-
mated by well-defined institutional boundaries: the courts and the
state. Unquestionably these institutions do have a pervasive influence,
and lawyers and legal academics have a most understandable interest in
attending to these institutions' workings and decisions. Restriction of
critical attention solely to these institutions is not well founded, how-
ever, and has distortive implications. The law must not be defined sim-
ply by what lawyers do or by what courts decide.
The narrowing of the definition of law can be criticized on both social
scientific and analytic bases. Findings in the sociology of law, for exam-
ple, establish that law is not uniquely associated with the state. Instead,
law may be most fundamentally "'an ordering' of human behavior, in
any group of interacting people, no matter how small or how com-
plex. ' '62 Insights from the anthropology of law substantiate that there
are multiple legal levels; there are as many legal systems, in fact, as there
are functioning subgroups within society.6 3 Philosophic investigation
could amplify these findings by verifying how the concept of law has a
variety of meanings in daily usage, usages that may well involve differ-
ent language games and not some one institutionally validated form.
64
This critique allows for the reintegration of law within the model of
society previously advanced. The different meanings and forms law pos-
sesses within society condition its character and power as an institution.
Plainly, the law as an institution exerts pervasive influence over the vari-
ous participants and interests in modem society. Yet the influence of
any interest, it has been established, is not total. While the power of law
as an institution pervades society, the institution is in turn influenced by
61. Se supra notes 6-9,13-15.
62. Pospisil, Legal Levels and the Mulipl&ty of Legal Systems in Human Soc'eties, 9 J. CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION 2,6 (1967) (citing E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF LAW 24, 36-37 (1936)).
The work of Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman exemplifies the incorporation of this
sociological approach into legal analysis. See, e.g., Reisman, Law/roim the Poliq Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL LAw ESSAYS I (M. McDougal & M. Reisman eds. 1981).
The sociology of law approach is best illustrated in THE POIrTICS OF LAw by Chambliss'
reappraisal of criminology. See Chambliss, Towarda Radical Crimnology, supra note 4, 230, 231.
63. See Pospisil, supra note 62, at 24.
64. Set L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe tran.
3rd ed. 1968) and J.L AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (J.0. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds.
3rd ed. 1979),_.Eor an explication of Wittgenstein's relevance to social and political thought,
see H.F. PITKN, WrrrGENSTIN AND JUSTICE (1973).
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various political and economic interests within society. It should be re-
called that this is one of the most important arguments elaborated by
the essays under review. 65 Also a central argument advanced is that the
law does not express merely one political or economic interest nor does it
express any one interest in an unvarying fashion. Not only does the law
as an institution permeate society, therefore, but the various interests at
work in society permeate the law; the sources for the characterization of
law extend beyond the law's institutional confines. As the social scien-
tific evidence documents, not only may interests external to the law in-
fluence its institutional nature, but they may also establish alternative
and partly independent legal systems.
3. The Transformed Representation of the Relation between Action and Law
Greater clarification of the many dimensions and sources of law yields
a more accurate conception of the relation between social change and
law. Most generally, there should be little doubt that any attempt to
effect fundamental change in or through the law is a demanding and
arduous task. The power of the existing legal structure is great and
highly pervasive. This power ranges from influences on persons' beliefs
through the generation of complex cultural codes66 to the ability to ex-
ert social control through force. Because of the massiveness of these fac-
tors, efforts to confront and change legal institutions in any kind of
frontal and fundamental manner should not expect to be successful.
Further, even if successful in a limited sense, the eradication of certain
legal institutions would not eliminate the law's persisting influence
throughout the rest of society.
Despite these many levels of complexity and influence, however, the
power of the legal structure is finite. To reiterate, no power's influence
is complete; its character is influenced by diverse and often competing
interests. With reference to the law, this entails minimally that there are
gaps in the legal structure, spaces that allow some protection and crev-
ices that offer a toehold for resistance and opposition. Further, because
the law's character is not homogeneous, battles can be waged to differ-
entiate and promote laws that are more progressive and socially desira-
ble.67 Not only may there be spaces for progressive interests within the
law, but the interests of the law itself--due process, for example-may
have beneficial impact. The existence of legal rules may provide protec-
tion against the extremes of arbitrary state action.68 It may be that "any
65. See mpra text accompanying notes 30-37.
66. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 287.
67. See Rabinowitz, supra note 9, at 312.
68. See id at 313.
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legal system . . . carries with it large components of equity and justice
that can provide some degree of protection to the masses of the people,
that provide a platform from which further progress can be made, and
that also provide a vision of social justice that inspires action."'69
All these possibilities for action and change depend on the structure of
existing legal institutions. The structure of the law, however, must not
be reified. 70 As delineated above, perpetuation of this structure does not
exist totally independent of human activity. If society and the legal
structure within society are at least in part in the process of continuous
creation by human beings,7 1 then the possibilities of action do not de-
pend merely on gaps in the legal structure or on certain progressive rul-
ings. The possibility of social change is not simply a result of what the
existing legal system allows, for the legal structure depends on human
activity for its perpetuation and reproduction. Because partly depen-
dent on human activity, the legal structure may be changed by human
activity as well. This point is admittedly only theoretical; the resistance
of the structure to change must not and cannot be minimized. What the
argument against reification does establish, however, is that the persis-
tence of the legal structure is not mandated by some underlying histori-
cal necessity but partly by the actions of human beings. Because human
actions help to determine and to maintain the nature of the constructed
totality that is the law, when these actions are redirected, the legal struc-
ture may change too. Hence, the argument is that society and the legal
structure within society do not operate simply on the basis of large-scale
influences and forces-whether political or economic. Society and the
law may well operate-and be transfigured-depending on how indi-
viduals and groups within society act in their most routine and ordinary
interactions, how they dominate, acquiesce, resist, and challenge. The
perpetuation-and transformation--of the legitimating power of a legal
or social system may in fact depend on such myriad tiny instances. 72
The most significant battles for social change, then, may be the battles
in the trenches.
With rare exceptions the essays collected in The Politics of Law do not
69. Id at 317 (referring to E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975)).
70. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 23, at 290. See also Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech,
supra note 4, 253, 260.
71. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 290. See generaly R. BERNSTEIN, PRAXIS AND ACTION
(1971).
72. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 290. While emphasizing the role played by individuals
at the level of daily interactions, Gordon stresses only the opportunities for domination and
acquiescence, not for resistance and challenge. See also M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUN-
ISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1977); E.P. THOMPSON, supra note 69; D. HAY, P. LINE-
BAUGH, J. RULE, E.P. THOMPSON, C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND
SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975).
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elucidate either the possibilities for legal change or the role human ac-
tivity may have in effecting this change.73 This may result partly be-
cause the general intent is critique of the existing legal structure rather
than elaboration of its possible reformation. Partially, though, it is also
a result of a limitation in perspective. Up to this point the argument
here has been that this view is a product of a limitation in theory, a
failure to pursue the insight that any societal influence is not total but
allows space for different interests, even oppositional interests, to exist
and possibly thrive. An additional argument must also be made, how-
ever, that this limitation is not simply a limitation of insight into theory
but is also a limitation of insight into practice. Not only is change in the
law or change through the law a theoretical possibility: this possibility is
being actualized in current, ongoing practice.
Perhaps the most abiding implication of these ongoing practical ef-
forts is that people can use the law to gain greater control over their own
lives. Sometimes this occurs through effective use of existing legal struc-
tures, whether the example be tenant or community organizing, labor
battles, or pro se divorce. 74 In other cases, the need is to go beyond
existing legal structures and create new areas and categories of the law.
Feminist concerns--sexual harassment, domestic violence, comparable
worth 75-are important examples here. There are also instances where
particular interests work to extend legal control not so much by recourse
to the law of the state but by creation of contract and enforcement struc-
tures at a quite separate legal level. Union labor contracts are most
illustrative.76 The insights of practice also demonstrate that recourse to
73. The major exceptions are the articles by Klare, supra note 7, Gordon, supra note 23,
and Rabinowitz, supra note 19.
74. On tenant and community organizing, see S. KAHN, ORGANIZING (1982). On pro se
divorce, see M. AVERY, D. POLAN, & S. ELDRICH, Do YOUR OWN DIVORCE IN CONNECTI-
CUT: THE PRO SE DISSOLUTION KIT FOR CONNECTICUT (1975).
75. For bibliographies-including general background material, legal articles, and
cases--on all three areas, see 13TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WOMEN AND THE LAW, 1982
SOURCEBOOK at 63-65 (domestic violence); 239 (sexual harassment in education); 103-13
(comparable worth).
76. While a union contract may strengthen existing state or national regulations, often of
greater importance is the certainty of enforcement that the contract helps to ensure. For
example, while well aware that state and national regulations exist concerning pesticide use,
the United Farm Workers (UFW) have included specific provisions in their contracts regard-
ing both what pesticides may not be used and what procedures shall be followed to make sure
workers do not enter treated fields before the pesticides have broken down into nontoxic
substances. See Agreement between the Ahnaden Vinevards, Inc. and the United Farm Workers of
America, AFL-CIO 7 (1974). In creating such provisions, the UFW not only ensures that pesti-
cide control does not depend on state enforcement, which is weak at best, but gives concrete
enforcement abilities to the workers, something that contributes to their own sense of power.
See also WOMEN'S LABOR PROJECT, BARGAINING FOR EQUALITY (1980) (provides strategies





the law, at whatever level, may not be beneficial unless enough of a
power base is established to protect or assert one's interests. This may
apply whether the attempt is to resort to existing law or to create new
law. 7  Finally, there is evidence that actions are still available even
when recourse to the law is either unavailable or ineffective. 78
The implication of these examples is not that victories are easy, fre-
quent, or permanent. Despite their difficulty, infrequency, and imper-
manency, victories do occur, successful actions are possible. Further,
actions undertaken in relation to the law may employ any of a number
of possible approaches, whether in dependence on existing legal struc-
tures, in creation of new areas of legal attention and protection, in main-
tenance of legal levels other than the state, or in action independent, but
not necessarily in contravention, of any established legal forms. Not
only may battles in the trenches be won but, if Gramsci's analysis is
correct, they may be unavoidably necessary if change is to take place.79
Many small acts may not be sufficient for basic change, but they may be
the necessary precondition. More importantly for objectives here, inves-
tigation at both theoretical and practical levels confirms that action
77. Again using the United Farm Workers as an example, the UFW waited until the mid-
1970's to push actively for a state law in California that would govern the rights of
farmworkers to organize. Prior to that time the UFW knew that it lacked sufficient political
power to protect any such law from reflecting grower more than farmworker interests. Only
the force of a nationwide boycott against certain power products during the mid- 1970's gave
the UFW the power it needed to make the growers agree to a law strongly supportive of farm
workers' rights, a law finally enacted in the spring of 1975. See Agricultural Labor Relations
Act (ALRA), CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1140-66 (West Supp. 1981-82). Any suggestion that Gov-
ernor Jerry Brown played the critical role in passage of the ALRA is not so much inaccurate
as misleading. Without the political power the UFW had gained through the boycott, the
growers either wouid have refused to accede to any law or would have pushed through a law
extremely favorable to their own position. For accounts of the UFW's legislative efforts dur-
ing 1974-75, see J. LEVY, CESAR CHAVEZ 428-35 (1975) and R. TAYLOR, CHAVEZ AND THE
FARM WORKERS 328-30 (1975).
78. In its union organizing campaign against J.P. Stevens & Co., the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (ACTWU) was repeatedly frustrated by Stevens' viola-
tion of the National Labor Relation Act and by its refusal to comply with National Labor
Relation Board orders. SeejP. Stevens Boycott Fact Sheets (1978). To pressure Stevens' into
resuming good-faith bargaining talks, ACTWU began a successful campaign, waged entirely
outside the labor law framework, of isolating Stevens' board of directors from other businesses
by forcing their resignations from interlocking directorates. See Wall St. J. 8 (September 13,
1978).
Other, more local examples of efforts taken independently of existing law include pressur-
ing employers without or in addition to a strike, see Strike Back, 18 AMERICAN LABOR 1 (1982),
and local actions on job safety, see Do-It-Yourself Tactics, 15 AMERICAN LABOR 1 (1981).
79. Perhaps one of the problems of legal training is that the model for practice, legal or
bureaucratic, does not take this view into account. Even where legal change is desired, fre-
quently the model is one that works from the top of the power hierarchy down rather than
from the bottom up. An approach like Gramsci's seriously questions how much this model
can possibly do to effect basic legal change at the top or to create any sense of personal or
group self-control at the bottom. On the issue of legal training in general, see Kennedy, supra
note 8.
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taken in relation to law may be one central way for this change to
occur.
80
B. Reconstruction of the Character of Legal Reasoning
Significant parallels exist between reconstruction of the character of
law and reconstruction of the character of legal reasoning. Just as re-
construction of law depends on a transformed characterization of soci-
ety, so typification of legal reasoning rests on a renewed delineation of
the reasoning available within society. Reconfirmation of the character-
ization of society achieved in the last section will therefore assist ascer-
tainment of the reasoning appropriate to the social and political spheres
and, consequently, to law.
The analysis proffered in this section supports the critique advanced
in The Politics of Law that legal reasoning is not an autonomous and
objective process of rationality. It also demonstrates that the failure of
the pure reasoning paradigm does not ineluctably entail that legal rea-
soning merely reflects personal choice, policy preference, or the perpetu-
ation of various political and economic interests by means of power.
While it may be true that the law affords no comprehensive, objective
rationality, the conclusion need not be that the law embodies no model
of reasoning whatsoever. Countering arguments within social, legal,
and philosophic theory establish that this conclusion is too constricted.
Precisely the applicability to the law of a model of practical rationality
must be entertained. Importantly, reappropriation of the category of
practical reason also entails revivification of the concept of politics.
Reconstruction of the character of legal reasoning depends, then, on a
transformed understanding of the nature of reason available within
human society. The central role the various interests play in society,
emphasized in the last section, must be reasserted. The possibility that
interests may act independently of hegemonic influences challenges any
affirmation of an underlying logic of historical necessity 8 and brings
into question the availability of a transcendent rationality uniformly ap-
plicable to the determination of each concrete interest. 2 The inviolable
role performed by these diverse interests help to demonstrate that the
structure of human society is neither uniform nor unambiguously
predetermined.
This depiction reconfirms that recourse to pure reason is inappropri-
ate for analysis of human society; attention should turn instead to
80. See Taub & Schneider, upra note 36, at 124, and Klare, supra note 17, at 84.
81. See Gordon, supra note 23, at 291.
82. On both points in this sentence, see the text accompanying note 59.
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whether practical reason is the proper analytic model. Contemporary
inquiry into the concept of practical reason locates the source of its in-
spiration in Aristotle. Aristotle maintains that when the subject under
investigation is human action, attainment of the precision available in
theoretical knowledge is not possible. Investigation is always limited to
"that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the
subject at hand admits...,"8a3 and "there are not fixed data in matters
concerning action and questions of what is beneficial .... "8a4 Exami-
nation of the character of the good illustrates the precision available to
practical reason. The good may be defined as that at which all things
aim, 5 but yet the nature of the good is not unitary. "[T]he good cannot
be something universal, common to all cases, and single; for if it were, it
would not be applicable in all categories but only in one."'8 6 In contrast
to the Platonic perspective, therefore, the good is not some element com-
mon to all its uses as though derived from one "Form," one transcendent
essence . 7 Practical reason cannot impose a universal form on all exam-
ples; it is rather directed toward the concrete situations themselves and
must grasp these circumstances in all their particularity.8
Contemporary reflection on practical reason extends Aristotle's analy-
sis. The most important insight is that the precision of practical reason
is dependent not simply on the object it studies but on the concrete,
situated perspective that informs the analysis undertaken. Hans-Georg
Gadamer comments:
Is not . . . all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified in
various ways? If this is true, then the idea of an absolute reason is impossi-
ble for historical humanity. Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical
terms, i.e., it is not its own master, but remains constantly dependent on
the given circumstances in which it operates.8 9
While the situated nature of human existence may well contribute to the
distortions in the ability to reason, more significantly this situated exist-
ence is also constitutive of the ability to reason. 90 What an individual
83. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS I, 3, 1094b 24 (Ostwald trans. 1962).
84. Id at 11, 2, 1104a 3.
85. Id. at I, 1, 1094a 2.
86. Id at I, 6, 1096a 28.
87. Id at I, 6, 1096b 25.
88. See H.-G. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 21 (1975).
89. Id at 245.
90. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 9 (1958). Paul Ricoeur explores the social
and political implications of this constitutive/distortive tension in his work on ideology and
utopia. Ricoeur argues that a nonpejorative dimension of ideology must be affirmed; ideol-
ogy here is constitutive of the situated character of human understanding. The distortive
possibilities of ideology are not at all dismissed, but there must be recognition that distortion
depends on a prior (logical not necessarily temporal) sense of constitution. For the most am-
plified presentation of Ricoeur's views here, see his forthcoming volume on ideology and uto-
179
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brings to a situation from tradition, history, race, ethnic background,
sex, class, region, or religion may prejudice his or her understanding,
choice, or reason, but these factors are also the very capacities that make
understanding, choice, and reason possible.91 Knowledge is not in-
dependent of the interests that inform the character of an individual or
group; knowledge is inextricably bound to these interests. Indeed, says
Jurgen Habermas, "[T]he interest of reason . . . can no longer be con-
ceived as an autarchic self-explication of reason. . . . [I]f we compre-
hend the cognitive capacity and critical power of reason as deriving
from the self-constitution of the human species under contingent natural
conditions, then it is reason that inheres in interest . ' 92
If emphasis on the concreteness of objects and perspectives informs
the nature of practical reason qua practical, a similar emphasis also en-
lightens the character of practical reason qua reason. In any examina-
tion of human society the loss of a universal form or an omniscient
perspective eliminates any possibility of pure reason; practical reason,
however, does not depend on these "objective" and aperspectival quali-
ties. Instead, the contention of practical reason is that whatever whole
or totality may exist, it can be known only through-and on the basis
of-the parts (objects and perspectives) that compose it. Roberto Unger
agrees, noting that this orientation is quite contrary to most contempo-
rary analyses. Unger argues that whatever sense of the universal can be
affirmed is attained not through abstraction from particularity but
rather through "the direct elucidation of the particular. '93 It is incorrect
to reduce the universal to abstract propositions; it is embodied only in its
separate expressions. 94 Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance-
the interrelation of particulars without one underlying element common
to all-is also pertinent here.95 Rational determination of a practical
pia, which I am presently editing for publication. A more abbreviated presentation is
available in P. RICOEUR, Science and Ideology, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
222 (J. Thompson ed. & trans. 1981).
91. See H.-G. GADAMER, supra note 88, at 263. For a feminist contribution to this herme-
neutic analysis, see MacKinnon, supra note 39, at 538 n.56 ("Ultimately, the feminist ap-
proach turns social inquiry into political hermeneutics: inquiry into situated meaning, one in
which the inquiry itself participates. A feminist political hermeneutics would be a theory of
the answer to the question, What does it mean? that would comprehend that the first ques-
tion to address is, To whom? within a context that comprehends gender as a social division of
power.").
92. J. IABERmAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 287 (1972) (emphasis in origi-
nal). In his more recent work, Habermas seems to have modified his position from the one
cited here. See, e.g. , J. HABERMAS, What is Universal agnaticrs, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EvOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1 (1979).
93. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITCS 36 (1976).
94. Id at 144.
95. See L. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 64, at §§ 65-67.
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concept like the good may proceed without the requirement that such
determination depends on a universal form.
Perhaps it is not too problematic to accept that a practical concept
like the good is known only through its particular manifestations in di-
verse objects. As noted, however, incorporation of diverse manifesta-
tions is only one aspect of the task of practical reason. Practical reason
must also take account of the different perspectives on a subject, per-
spectives that may vary widely according to the interests-racial, ethnic,
religious, sexual-that inform them. If Habermas is correct that reason
inheres in interest, it is less plain how practical reason reconciles these
interests.
Reappropriation of the concept of politics provides a fruitful ap-
proach to this problem. Like the renewed consideration of practical rea-
son, contemporary attention to a revived conception of politics finds its
source in Aristotle. Consistent with recent insight that practical reason
does not permit any uniformity of perspective, Aristotle argues of poli-
tics that the political whole, the "polis," is a compound: "a single
'whole', but a 'whole' composed, none the less, of a number of different
parts."'9 6 He adds that unity is necessary to some extent but complete
unity is not. In fact, "[t]here is a point at which a polis, by advancing in
unity, will cease to be a polis. . . .It is as if you were to turn harmony
into mere unison, or to reduce a theme to a single beat. The truth is
that the polis. . . is an aggregate of many members. . .. -"7 In agree-
ment with Aristotle here, Hannah Arendt maintains that "the human
condition of plurality,. . . the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth
and inhabit the world . . . is specifically the condition . . . of all polit-
ical life."' 9 Parallels with the characterization of society advanced in
the last section are patent.
In this conception, politics is the location where disputes between in-
terests99 occur. If reason inheres in interest, then the manifestation of
interests in politics means something quite different than customary us-
age dictates. No longer is politics merely a competition between inter-
ests; the rationality of one's interests can be cogently argued. Action
and speech, Aristotle claims, are the preeminent political activities; the
96. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, III, 1, 1274b § 2 (E. Barker trans. 1958).
97. Id at II, 5, 1263b §§ 14-15.
98. H. ARENDT, supra note 90, at 7 (emphasis in original).
99. The Habermasian perspective on interests must be maintained here. Interests are not
subjective predilections but basic principles and attitudes. Interests are not deviations from
reason but instead the foundation for its constitution. &e supra text accompanying notes 89-
92.
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emphasis is on persuasion and not force or violence. ' ° Comparison
with the role of action elaborated in the last section clarifies that polit-
ical action taken on behalf of one's interests helps to constitute the char-
acter of rationality available within society. The rationality of society is
not something uniform or pregiven; it is defined by the interests that
compose it. Society's rationality is specified not in abstraction from its
parts but through their elucidation; it is a product of an ongoing process
of political argumentation and struggle.
This conception of politics does not suggest that reconciliation be-
tween interests will ever be fully attained. Partly this is a result of the
limitation of precision the subject allows; practical solutions are rarely
able to encompass particularities equally. Reconciliation is also limited,
though, by the fact that various interests will define differently what
rationality signifies. The new conception of politics does not thereby
dismiss the possibilities of argumentation; different perspectives need not
be totally incommensurate. This conception does acknowledge, how-
ever, that differences will remain, and it emphasizes that the political
arena is the appropriate location for these struggles over the institution
of different interests.
This change in the concept of politics does not imply any necessary
alteration in the present political sphere. The change effected is a differ-
ence in model only. What the change does accomplish is a modification
and enlargement of perspective. As one author in The Politics of Law
comments, "If politics is conceived as the process and the institution by
which communities collectively guide their destinies, allocate their re-
sources, resolve their disputes, and protect their members' experience of
personhood, then politics should flourish, not disappear in the radical
ideal." 10'
Reappropriation of the concepts of practical reason and politics sig-
nificantly informs the reconstruction of the character of legal reasoning.
When legal reasoning is discerned to be not simply either the imposition
of a unique rational form or the residue of a competition between inter-
ests, then its nature has quite a different cast. Attention to how this
reformulated conception of legal reasoning might approach the difficult
legal question of equality may prove a provocative illustration of the
reorientation this change admits. Traditionally, an approach advocat-
ing substantive equality argues that a formal equality approach is insuf-
ficient. Treating people as if they were already equal does not eliminate
100. See H. ARENDT, supra note 90, at 25, 26.
101. Klare, supra note 17, at 84.
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the systematic inequalities (for example, by race or sex) that currently
exist. Instead, the substantive approach argues, an equality of results
must be pursued.' 0 2 Insights from the analysis of practical reason and
politics demands, however, that the character of these "equal results" be
carefully scrutinized. Equality must not mean homogeneity, a universal
form applied to all.10 3 Equality is not the elimination of differences but
instead their nondiscriminatory preservation. Whatever equality is as a
whole or a totality, it can be known only through the parts that compose
it. The interests of these parts are rational articulations of their self-
hood; for equality to be truly substantive and not merely formal, the
integrity of these interests must be preserved. 0 4 By incorporating the
reinvigorated characteristics of practical reason and politics, therefore,
legal reasoning may be at its best a most serious attempt to constitute,
maintain, and perpetuate the real interests and values of the individuals
and groups within the collectivity.
102. See Rosenblatt, supra note 10, at 271.
103. For a feminist perspective here, see MacKinnon, supra note 39, at 537 ("Feminism
not only challenges masculine partiality but questions the universality imperative itself.
Aperspectivity is revealed as a strategy of male hegemony.").
104. Feminist analysis of sex discrimination law has developed this perspective in much
greater detail. One recent feminist critique concludes that the courts have taken two distinct
paths on the problem of sex discrimination. The first approach affirms that the social situa-
tion of the sexes is an expression of a pattern of sex differences. Here sex discrimination
occurs when a rule or practice is irrationally grounded upon a sex difference. The second
approach goes beyond the first in asserting that the social situation of the sexes is unequal,
rather than merely or basically different. This latter approach would prohibit practices that
have disparate impact upon one sex, discrimination in effects. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101-02 (1979).
Significantly, this feminist critique does not advocate either mere repudiation of the "dif-
ferences approach" or unqualified approval of the "inequality approach." The efforts of the
inequality approach to eliminate disparate impact are indeed most crucial, and, as the cur-
rent legal and social climate readily suggests, these efforts are extremely difficult battles to
wage. This feminist critique maintains, however, that the inequality approach is limited to
the extent its goal is the creation of some neutral personhood. Instead, argues this critique, "if
sex discrimination is a problem of inequality, as chances for parity between the sexes are
opened, women's differences from men must be equally accommodated and equally valued,
without penalty or preference." Id at 106. The differences approach can be reappropriated.
By reintegrating it with the inequality approach, these two approaches together can "guaran-
tee an equality that begins to comprehend womanhood as distinct and fully human." Id. at
221 (emphasis in original). This attempt to eliminate inequality while preserving difference is
a most distinctive contribution of the new feminist jurisprudence. The definition of equality
is transformed.
On the applicability of this concept of equality to racial discrimination, see Freeman's cri-
tique of color-blindness:
Why should color-blindness be an end in itself, a reference point against which to test
questions of racial discrimination? It has become a way of abstracting the American
black experience out of its own historical setting to the point where all ethnics become
fungible. The ideology of fungibility is part of the process of refusing to deal with the
concreteness of black experience.
Freeman, supra note 12, at 101.
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Reconstruction of the character of legal reasoning unifies response to
the critique advanced on this subject in The Politics of(Law. The heirs of
legal realism are correct that legal reasoning does not follow a model of
pure, autonomous, objective reasoning. This criticism is conclusive.
This position miscarries, however, when it holds that if legal reasoning
does not follow this objective model it is then not a process of reasoning
but merely subjective choice or policy preference. The heirs of legal re-
alism neglect the alternative model that exists in practical reason. As for
the heirs of the Marxian tradition, they are correct that legal reasoning
is composed of diverse political, economic, and social interests. They are
incorrect, however, to the extent they maintain the influence of these
interests is necessarily distortive. As for the criticism that legal reasoning
is political, both critical stances merit objection to the extent their con-
ception of the political is too constricted. That legal reasoning is polit-
ical in the narrow, distortive sense-a battle between wills-is a telling
criticism; that legal reasoning is political in the positive constitutive
sense-a preservation and enhancement of the interests of society's
members--may be its highest ideal.
V. Conclusion
Law is a whole, a constructed totality, known through the contribu-
tions of its parts. As an institution, law attempts to incorporate the
needs and goals of the diverse interests that make up society; this is inev-
itably a political process. Both the definition and the achievement of
legal principles are the results of political struggles, both historical and
contemporary. 10 5 Just as legal reasoning, so are legal principles prod-
ucts of practical reason and political processes. No legal principle has
an independent, transcendent derivation. This may also help explain
why laws rightly change and why no legal battle is ever finally won.
Law is not simply a political process but it is inextricably bound to a
political process. °6
105. On the application of this argument to the concept of free speech, see Kairys, supra
note 7,parrh.
106. Though this review does not focus explicitly on theories of legal interpretation, this
paragraph alludes to some implications the analysis may offer for that inquiry. Comparison
of this analysis with recent work by Owen Fiss and Paul Brest better situates the perspective
argued here. Fiss maintains that a bounded objectivity is available to the law. Any interpre-
tive activity is governed by disciplining rules; an interpretive community consists of those who
recognize the rules as authoritative. In law, Fiss says, the interpretive community is a reality.
"Judges ... belong to an interpretive community ... by virtue of a commitment to uphold
and advance the rule of law itself.... Judges know that if they relinquish their membership
in the interpretive community, or deny its authority, they lose their right to speak with the
authority of the law." Fiss, Objectiviy and Interprelation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 746-47 (1982).
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The great insight of the essays collected in The Politics of Law is that
law is political and not the objective, rational process it is often claimed
to be. This deconstructive insight is achieved in a sophisticated and
probing fashion. The limitation of these essays is that they do not pur-
sue far enough how reconstructive efforts may proceed on the basis of
the deconstructive analysis advanced. In presenting some analyses help-
ful to the reconstructive task--Gramsci's concept of hegemony, revivi-
fied concepts of practical reason and politics-the attempt has been to
demonstrate not only their availability but their fruitfulness. It is right
and proper to criticize the distortive politics of law; it is also necessary to
reclaim for law its constitutive character as political.
In contrast, Brest argues that interpretive rules themselves respond to their interpreters' back-
grounds and experiences. "Much of our commitment to the rule of law really seems a com-
mitment to the rule of our law." Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 772
(1982) (emphasis in original). Brest concludes that
the line separating law from politics is not all that distinct and that its very location is a
question of politics. I do not think this is nihilism. Rather, I believe that examining 'rule
of law'-even at the risk of discovering that it is entirely illusory-is a necessary step
toward a society that can satisfy the aspirations that make us hold to the concept so
tenaciously.
Id at 773. See also Brest, The Miconceived Questfor the Orig'nal Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204 (1980) and Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy." The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L. REV. 1063 (1981).
It should be apparent that this review concurs with, and attempts to push further, a posi-
tion like Brest's. Brest's viewpoint resonates well with the hermeneutic insights by Gadamer,
Ricoeur, and Habermas cited favorably in this review. See text accompanying notes 89-92
and notes 90, 91. Fiss' argument, on the other hand, locates itself within quite a different
hermeneutic stance. In contending that interpretation may be objective, even if in a bounded
or limited way, Fiss allies himself with the hermeneutics advanced by E.D. Hirsch and Emilio
Betti. There is a growing literature contrasting the two hermeneutic approaches. For
Hirsch's criticism of Gadamer, see E.D. HIRSCH, JR., Cadamer's Theoy of Interpretation, in VA-
LIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 245 (1967). Gadamer responds to Betti in H.-G. GADAMER, Her-
meneutics and Htoricism, supra note 88, 460, 464-66. For essays by and commentary on Betti,
Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, see J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS
(1980).

